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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Paul Brian Tucker, was charged with 
aiJ<Jravated robbery, a first degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery after 
a Jury trial on May 10, 1983. He was then sentenced to the 
indeterminate term of not less than five years to life in the 
lllah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Early on the morning of February 18, 1983, Larry 
lllrleffi and Perry Georges were returning to their rooms at 
the Little Americil Motel at 500 south and Main Street in 
Salt Lake City (T. 6). 
well ligrted, Mr. Rirleffi heard sumeth1n,J heh1nd him (T. 61. 
He turned to see what or who was mak the ncq se and f•Jund a 
handgun pointed at his face (T. 6). Ap;>ellant, the person 
holding the gun, had a bandana over the lower part of his face 
and demanded that Mr. Birleffi give him all his money (T. 6, 
10). Mr. Birleffi reached into his pockets and gave appellant 
all the money he had -- about $21.00 (T. 7, 8). Refore 
entering Little America to contact the police about the 
robbery, Mr. Birleffi watched appellant run towards the 
intersection, where a pol;ce car happened to he (T. 8). 
The police car at the intersection belonged to two 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's deputies (T. 47). After appellant 
ran in front of the patrol car on 500 South and then back to 
the sidewalk and into the shrubbery on the north side of 
Little America, the two deputies stopped and pursued appellant 
on foot. They momentarily lost sight of him in the shrubs, 
but saw him emerge from the bushes further to the west and run 
back across 500 south (T. 48-50). One of the officers 
followed him into an alley, where she lost sight of him (T. 
5 2). However, while the pursuit was in progress, Officer 
Robert Dortch of the Salt Lake Police Department's vice squad 
came along and after observing the situation, joined in the 
pursuit (T. 87). Officer Dortch chased appellant in the alley 
and briefly lost sight of him, but continued running in the 
same direction until he arrived at a vacant lot (T. 88). 
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1Jff1cer Dortch scannerl the vacant lot with his flashlight and 
appellant, who ducked when the light fell upon him. 
The officer drew his revolver, informed appellant that he was 
a police officer, and then approached him (T. 89). Appellant, 
who was dressed very much like the man Officer Dortch had been 
chasing, was perspiring and exhibiting a rapid pulse (T. 
8g-%). A search of appellant subsequent to his arrest 
uncovered a bandana with a knot tied in it and $21.00 in cash 
(T. 72, 73). 
Shortly after appellant had been arrested, police 
arrived with Mr. Birleffi and Mr. Georges, who identified 
appellant as the person who had robbed Mr. Birleffi. A search 
of the shrubre ry near Little America yielded a handgun that 
fit the description given by Mr. Birleffi (T. 58). 
Approximately three weeks after the incident, Mr. 
Birlef fi picked appellant from an eight man lineup and 
identified appellant as the man who had robred him. He also 
identified appellant in court as the robber (T. 9, 12, 15). 
-3-
AP 1. 1.r-...i r 'J 
PC>] NT 
APPELLANT'S FA! LllRI T(l FOi I ()\'O i'l!lli'l-1' 
PROCEDllRF:S FOR •>'1.llC1H,1; T\I l·ll<i<Y 
BIRLEFFI'S IUr:NTIFICArJ1lN 
PRECLUDE:S r•:' \l'l'f'l\L ell-' 
APPELLANT'S ARGllMf'J'i !'HA.T T!ll 'JTSTl MONY 
SHOULD HAVr: RF:EN SllPI•PrSSf[); 
ALTF:RNATIVELY, ADM!Sc-I11N •IF Tl!AT TFST!MONY 
DID NOT DENY ,\PPELI.A:--JT 11: 1f l'f,'(J('r:ss rw LAW. 
Relying largely rm Ned v. Hiygers, 409 U.S. 188 
(1972), appellant ar<Jues that the showup irlentification 
procedure used in his case (i.e., irlentification of appellant 
in the vacant lot where he was founrl sh<Jrt 1 y after the 
robbery) was impermissibly suggestive an(i therefore Larry 
Rirleffi's testimony concerning his showup identification of 
appellant and his subsequent lineup identification of 
appellant have beeel suppressed. 
There is nothing in the record to inrlicate that 
appellant objected, by way of either a pretrial motion to 
suppress or a specific obJecti"n at trial, to the showup 
identification testiri.J'l} he now challenges on appeal. Under 
these circumstances, appellant has waiverl any alleged error 
concerning the admission of that testimony. See State v. 
John, Utah, 667 P.2d 32 (1983), citing Rule 12, lltah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (Utah C<)rle Ann. 77-35-12 ( 1982)), and 
State v. Mccardell, lltcih, 6S.-'. P.! 1l 942 (19H21. Appellant 
apparently marle no pretrial rnr·t l''n t<J suppress the lineup 
identification testimony, as req•Jired rcy Rule 12(b)(2), Utah 
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''"" ,,f Criminal Procedure, and therefore he has waived any 
,! 1ecl inn to the admission of that testimony. State v. John. 
f'llr·t ht'rm"re, althouyh at trial appellant objected to the 
I 11><·"<' testimony on foundational grounds, he did not object to 
it''" the specific grounrls he now argues on appeal. The 
, "nt1,·1cporaneous objection rule requires timely and specific 
"hJt•<.'t ion at trial to admission of evidence in order for the 
'1uest ion of admissibility to be considered on appeal. State 
v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d at 947. For this Court to consider a 
defendant's objection to the admission of evidence at trial, 
tht' defendant must have specifically stated to the trial court 
the same yrounds for objection he presents on appeal. Ibid. 
see also State v. Davis, Utah, No. 18892, slip op. 
at p. 11 (decided June 25, 1984). In light of this rule, 
appellant's assignment of error concerning the admission of 
the lineup identification testimony should not be considered 
by this Court on appeal. 
Even if this Court decides to consider appellant's 
assignment of error concerning the admission of Larry 
Rirleffi's identification testimony, the testimony was 
properly admitted. Contrary to appellant's claim, the showup 
1clentification procedure employed in his case was not "so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. 
Un1te<i States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
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In State v. Mccumber, Utah, fi22 P. 2r1 353 ( lqRll), 
this Court adopted the standarrls set forth in Neil v. Higgers 
and other related United States Supreme Court decisions for 
determining whether an identification procerlure gives rise to 
a substantial likelihood of misidentification: 
Police identification procedures such 
as photograph displays, lineups, showups, 
and the like, do not deny the accused due 
process of law unless, under a totality of 
the circumstances, they are so 
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification as to 
deny the accused a fair trial. [Stovall 
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).J Where an 
identification procedure, even though 
suggestive, does not give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of 
misidentification, no due process 
violation has occurred. [Neil v. Biggers, 
409 U.S. 188 (1972).] In determining the 
re1iability of the identification under 
the totality of the circumstances, the 
court must also consider the opportunity 
of the witness to view the criminal at the 
time of the crime, the witness' degree of 
attention, the accuracy of any prior 
description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated during the 
identification procedure, and the time 
the crime and the identification. 
[Neil v. Biggers, supra; Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977),] 
622 P.2d at 357. Acknowledging that the victim of an 
attempted rape and aggravated sexual assault "had a very 
limited opportunity to observe her assailant" in that "[h]er 
view of his face was very brief, and occurred in a darkened 
room immediatley after she had awakened from sleep," the 
Mccumber Court also said: 
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Such factors, however, although they may 
weaken the probative impact of the 
evidence offered, do not mandate 
suppression of the evidence in the name of 
due process without some showing that the 
identification procedures were themselves 
imperrnissibly suggestive. 
622 P.2d at 357. 
In applying these tests to the present case, it 
becomes apparent that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, there was not a substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification: 
A. Opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime. 
Although Mr. Birleffi was face to face with 
appellant for only 15 to 20 seconds during the robbery, he 
observed appellant in a well lighted area and was able to note 
certain of appellant's characteristics as appellant fled, 
particularly his clothing and his frizzy hair (T. 8, 10). 
B. Degree of attention. 
Mr. Birleffi admitted that during the robbery, he 
initially focused on the gun pointed in his face. However, 
his attention shifted to appellant, with whom he was 
face-to-face, and he carefully observed appellant during, and 
moments after, the robbery (T. 8, 10). 
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C. Accuracy of prior rlescripti"n· 
This prong of the Mccumber/Biggers test is qlossed 
over by appellant. He virtually ignores the victim's 
testimony about the description of the rubber the victim gave 
to the police (T. 10). That description, which Mr. Birleffi 
made prior to viewing appellant in police custody, definitely 
fit appellant (T. 98). 
D. Level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness during the identification 
procedure. 
Mr. Birleffi's certainty in identifying appellant as 
the robter was well established. After seeing appellant at 
the location where police had apprehended him, Mr. Birleffi 
told police, "That is the fella" (T. 13). Moreover, Mr. 
Birleffi easily identified appellant in a lineup of eight men 
conducted approxiamtely three weeks after the robbery. An 
in-court identification also was made. 
E. Length of time between the crime and 
the identification. 
Little more than 20 minutes had passed between the 
time of the robtery and the time of the identification (T. 
12). It is likely that Mr. Birleffi, with the memory of the 
robtery still fresh, had in his mind a vivid image of the 
robber when he identified appellant. 
As noted by th is Court in State v. Clemons, Utah, 
580 P.2d 601 (1978), showups are useful in effectively 
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<·nf,,rciny the criminal law: 
The idea of taking the victim 
forthwith to identify a suspect is of 
value to the detained person if he is 
innocent; and while the matter is fresh in 
mind, it assists the victim in determining 
whether a suspect is or is not the 
perpetrator of the offense. 
580 P.2d at 602. The instant case is similar to Clemons and 
other cases where one person showups have been held proper. 
Banks v. State, Nev., 575 P.2d 592 (1978); State v. 
Arnold, 2fi Ariz. App. 542, 549 P.2d 1060 (1976). 
Nevertheless, appellant suggests that because he was 
handcuffed and clearly in police custody when the showup 
identification occurred, the identification procedure was 
impermissibly suggestive. However, those facts alone are not 
sufficient to render the procedure impermissibly suggestive. 
See State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 442, 443, 511 P.2d 159, 160 
(1973), where this Court held that "[i]t was entirely proper 
to have the victims see the [suspects] being detained [by the 
police]." Although probably suggestive, the showup procedure 
used, when tested against the standards set forth in Biggers 
and adopted in Mccumber, did not give rise to a substantial 
likelihood of misidentification. See State v. Bingham, Utah, 
P.2d , No. 18774, slip op. at pp. 2-3 (June 13, 1984). 
c;iven this, appellant's further argument that Mr. Birleffi's 
testimony concerning the lineup identification should not have 
been al lowed in -- an argument based solely on appellant's 
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contention that the "tainted" showup iclentification rc>nc1ered 
the subsequent lineup identification unreliable -- is 
similarly without merit. In sum, the identification 
procedures used in this case did not deprive appellant of due 
process of law, and, therefore, Mr. Birleffi's identification 
testimony was properly admitted. 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
requested jury instruction on eyewitness 
identification (R. 29-30) is modeled after that recommended in 
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
This Court has repeatedly held that a "Telfaire" instruction 
is not mandatory in all instances where eyewitness 
identification is crucial to the case. Instead, the decision 
of whether to give a Telfaire instruction is discretionary 
with the trial court. See State v. Bingham, Utah, P.2d 
No. 18774 (decided June 13, 1984); State v. Reedy, Utah, 681 
P.2d 1251 (1984); State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982). 
As noted in Bingham: 
Jury instructions must be considered as a 
whole. "When taken as a whole if they 
fairly tender the case to the Jury, the 
fact that one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or 
accurate as they might have been is not 
reversible error." State v. Brooks, Utah, 
638 P.2d 537, 542 (1981) (citation 
omitted). 
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:; 1 1 p op. at p . 1 • 
The trial court's instructions in appellant's case 
(see, particularly, Instructions No. 3, 6, and 12 (R. 45, 47, 
53)) fully informed the jury that the State had the burden of 
proving every element of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 10 (R. 51) instructed the 
jurors that they were the sole judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses and set forth specific guidelines for 
determining a witness's credibility. As in Bingham, the 
instructions, taken as a whole, "adequately advised the jury 
on the law pertaining to this case." Bingham, slip op. at p. 
4, citing State v. Schaffer, Utah, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981). 
Significantly, two eyewitnesses (i.e., Mr. Birleffi and Perry 
Georges (T. 33-46)) positively identified appellant as the 
robber; and there was additional physical evidence linking 
appellant to the crime (i.e., the bandana and the $21 cash 
found on appellant's person at the time of his arrest). Thus, 
this does not appear to be the kind of case identified by 
Justice Durham in her concurring opinion in State v. Newton, 
Utah, 681 P.2d 833 (1984), where "an instruction on the 
dangers of eyewitness identification is most appropriate." 
6Rl P.2d at 834. 
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Pf>I"lT I I I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN HIS CLOSING 
ARGUMENT DID NOT CONST I TllTF: REVERSI RLF: 
ERROR. 
Appellant argues that certain statements made by the 
prosecutor in his closing argument to the 1ury (see T. 108) 
amounted to improper comment on appellant's decision not to 
testify and thus constituted reversible error. However, even 
if those statements can be construed as a direct reference to 
appellant's not taking the stand, any error was harmless. 
Eliciting evidence of a defendant's decision to 
exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent, or 
prosecutorial comment thereon, may violate a defendant's right 
against self-incrimination. Doyle v. Ohio, 42fi U.S. 610 
(1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); State v. 
Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290 (1982); State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 
P.2d 146 (1981). In Wiswell, this Court stressed that it was 
the prosecutor's repeated efforts to elicit testimony about 
the defendant's post-arrest silence and his comment thereon in 
final argument that resulted in prejudice to the defendant. 
See Wiswell, 639 P.2d at 147. However, it was implied in 
Wiswell and expressed more clearly in State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 
at 1292, that evidence of or comment on a defendant's silence 
does not automatically result in prejudicial error. Curative 
instructions, for instance, are an important consideration for 
reviewing courts. See Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292. Also, Wiswell 
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1n11,l 1ed that if the improper evidence or prosecutorial comment 
1;; not extensive, reversible error may not result. See 
639 P.2d at 147-148, including the dissenting opinion 
of C.J. Hall. Finally, prompt, ameliorative reaction by the 
trial Judge to the allegedly improper prosecutorial comment 
generally will prevent prejudice to the defendant. See State 
Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975), including the concurring 
opinion of J. Maughan. 
It is not at all clear that the brief comments made 
by the prosecutor, to which appellant objects, were a direct 
reference to appellant's silence. But even assuming they 
were, the comments were not extensive, and immediately after 
the comments were made, the trial judge twice admonished the 
jury and the prosecutor that the burden was on the State to 
prove appellant's guilt (T. 108). Moreover, the trial court's 
instructions made clear that appellant had the right not to 
take the stand, that no adverse inferences should be drawn 
from appellant's decision not to testify, and that the State 
had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
appellant was guilty of the crime charged (see Instructions 
No. 3, 6, 11 (R. 45, 47, 52)). Under these circumstances, if 
the prosecutor's comments were error, such was harmless, in 
that even without the error there was not "a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant." 
State v. Fontana, Utah, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (1984), quoting 
state v. Hutchison, Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (1982). See also -----
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Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal (Utah rode .\nn, 
77-35-30 (1982)1; State v. Smith, lltah, 675 P.2d 'i21 (1YH3) 
(holding that although the prosecut(1r's remarks in closing 
argument were improper, they were harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant failed to follow proper procedures 
for suppression of the identification testimony he now 
challenges on appeal, the issue of whether that testimony 
should have been suppressed has not been preserved for appeal. 
Even if this Court were to consider that issue, admission of 
the testimony did not deny appellant due process of law. 
Further, the trial court's refusal to give 
appellant's requested eyewitness identification instruction to 
the jury was in conformity with this Court's recent decisions 
concerning "Telfaire" instructions. And finally, the 
prosecutor's remarks in closinq argument were, at most, 
harmless error. -tt;-




DA\lf' fl. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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